Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Singh, Hardeep (2012-09-10) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
September 2021 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Singh, Hardeep 
(2012-09-10) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
Recommended Citation 
"Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Singh, Hardeep (2012-09-10)" (2021). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/307 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYS Supreme Court 
Decisions in Article 78 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Singh v Evans
2012 NY Slip Op 32348(U)
September 10, 2012
Supreme Court, Franklin County
Docket Number: 2012-352
Judge: S. Peter Feldstein
Republished from New York State Unified Court
System's E-Courts Service.
Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for
any additional information on this case.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.
STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
HARDEEP SINGH, #08-A-5851,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #16-1-2012-0162.41
INDEX # 2012-352
-against- ORI #NY016015J
ANDREA W. EVANS, Chairwoman, 
NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Hardeep Singh, verified on April 20, 2012 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on April 27, 2012.  Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the September  2011 determination denying
him parole and directing he be held for an additional 24 months.  The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on May 2, 2012 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer
and Return, including in camera materials, verified on June 22, 2010, as well as
respondent’s Letter Memorandum of June 22, 2010.  The Court has also received and
reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto, verified on July 10, 2012 and filed in the Franklin
County Clerk’s office on July 13, 2012.  
On October 28, 2008 petitioner was sentenced in Orange County Court to a
controlling indeterminate sentence of 3a to 10 years on his convictions of the crimes of
Manslaughter 2° and Assault 3° (three counts).  Petitioner made his initial appearance
before a Parole Board on September 28, 2011.  Following that appearance, on October 3,
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2011, a decision was rendered  denying him discretionary release and directing that he be1
held for an additional 24 months.  The parole denial determination reads as follows:
FOLLOWING A CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORDS AND THE
INTERVIEW, IT IS THE CONCLUSION OF THIS PANEL THAT IF YOUR
[sic] WERE RELEASED AT THIS TIME THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT
LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW AND THAT YOUR RELEASE
WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND
WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY.  THIS DECISION IS BASED ON THE
FOLLOWING: YOU COME BEFORE THIS PANEL SERVING TIME FOR
YOUR CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER 2  DEGREE.  YOU WEREND
DRIVING YOUR 2004 LINCOLN TOWN CAR AND SERVING AS A LIMO
DRIVER WITH THREE PASSENGERS ON BOARD.  YOU HAVE
ADMITTED TO HAVING A NUMBER OR [sic] DRINKS BEFORE
ATTEMPTING TO TAKE YOUR PASSENGERS TO NYC.  DURING THE
DRIVE YOU DROVE YOUR VEHICLE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE
ROAD AND STRUCK AN ONCOMING VEHICLE HEAD ON.  TWO
PASSENGERS WERE IN THE OTHER VEHICLE, PASSENGERS IN BOTH
VEHICLES SUFFERED INJURIES AND ONE INNOCENT VICTIM IN THE
OTHER VEHICLE LOST HIS LIFE.  AS A DRIVER OF A LIMO OR CAB
YOU ARE EXPECTED TO BE SOBER AND ALERT WHEN BEHIND THE
WHEEL OF THE VEHICLE.  THE PUBLIC DESERVES NO LESS.  NOTED
ARE ALL RELEVANT FACTORS REQUIRED BY LAW INCLUDING YOUR
EEC, GED AND PROGRAM COMPLETIONS HOWEVER RELEASE AT
THIS TIME IS UNWARRANTED. PAROLE IS DENIED.
The parole denial determination was affirmed on administrative appeal with the final
determination apparently mailed to the petitioner on April 17, 2012.  This proceeding
ensued.
 Citing the transcript of the September 28, 2011 Parole Board appearance (Respondent’s Exhibit1
D), respondent asserts in her answering papers that the parole denial determination was actually rendered
on September 28, 2011.   According to respondent, the “computerized report” (Parole Board Release
Decision Notice annexed to her Answer and Return as Exhibit E) “ . . . was not prepared for transmittal to
the Petitioner under [until ?] October 3, 2012.”  The Court, however, finds nothing in the transcript of the
September 28, 2011 Parole Board appearance shedding any light on the question of when the parole denial
determination was actually issued.  The transcript indicates that at the conclusion of petitioner’s appearance
before the Board he was “excused” and “[a]fter due deliberation by the Parole Board panel, the following
decision was rendered . . .”  Although the parole denial determination decision is printed out, nothing in the
transcript indicates when the Parole Board panel actually concluded its deliberation and issued the decision. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision and Judgment, the Court will presume that the parole denial
determination was issued on October 3, 2011, as set forth in the Parole Board Release Decision Notice.
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At the time of petitioner’s September 28, 2011 Parole Board appearance and the
October 3, 2011 issuance of the denial determination Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as
amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A, §§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011,
provided, in relevant part, as follows: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . .(iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
At the time of petitioner’s September 28, 2011 Parole Board appearance Executive
Law  §259-c(4) provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall “ . . .establish
written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such
written guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to
assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released
to parole supervision . . .”  Executive Law §259-c(4), however, was amended by L 2011, ch
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62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective September 30, 2011 .  Thus, although the amended2
version of Executive Law §259-c(4) was not yet in effect at the time of petitioner’s
September 28, 2011 Parole Board appearance, it was in effect on October 3, 2011 when the
parole denial determination was issued.  The amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4)
provides that the New York State Board of Parole shall “ . . .establish written procedures
for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.  Such written procedures shall
incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing
before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist
members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates maybe released to
parole supervision . . .”  (Emphasis added).
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Citing, inter alia, Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc 3d 694,
petitioner first asserts that the Parole Board erred in failing to apply the amended version
of Executive Law §259-c(4) when it considered him for discretionary parole release and,
 L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, section 49(f) provides that “. . . the amendments to subdivision2
4 of section 259-c of the executive law made by section thirty-eight-b of this act shall take effect six months
after it shall have become a law . . .”  Since the underlying legislation was enacted on March 31, 2011, the
amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4) became effective as of September 30, 2011 (or October 1, 2011).
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ultimately, denied such release.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 2011 amendment to
Executive Law §259-c(4) was designated by the legislature as taking effect on
September 30, 2011, the Thwaites court found that the amendment had to be applied
retroactively to Mr. Thwaites’ March 16, 2010 parole denial determination.  This Court,
however, previously expressed its respectful disagreement with the conclusion of the
Thwaites court and, for the reasons set forth in the March 6, 2012 Decision and Judgment
of the Supreme Court, Albany County (Hon. Richard M. Platkin) in Hamilton v. New
York State Division of Parole, 36 Misc 3d 440, found no basis to apply the amended
version of Executive Law §259-c(4) in reviewing a pre-September 30, 2011 parole denial
determination even where such parole denial determination was affirmed on
administrative appeal after September 30, 2011.  See Tafari v. Evans, 36 Misc 3d 1216(A),
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 51355(U).  As stated by the Hamilton court, “[i]t is apparent . . . that
the State Legislature considered the question of the effectiveness of the 2011 Amendments
and determined that the new procedures contemplated by the amendments to Executive
Law §259-c(4) should not be given effect with respect to administrative proceedings
conducted prior to October 1, 2011.”  36 Misc 3d 440 at 443.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court recognizes that the facts and
circumstance in the case at bar present an unusual variation on the
Thwaites/Hamilton/Tafari theme.  As noted previously, the petitioner’s Parole Board
appearance occurred prior to the effective date of the amended version of Executive Law
§259-c(4) but the parole denial determination was issued after such effective date.  For
the reasons set forth below, however, the Court ultimately concludes that the amended
version of Executive Law §259-c(4) was not applicable to the Parole Board’s consideration
of petitioner for discretionary release.
5 of 10 
[* 5]
The discretionary parole release consideration process is ongoing in nature and
initially involves the creation/compilation of various records, reports and
recommendations with respect to the prospective parolee and his/her suitability for
release.  See 9 NYCRR §8000.5(a) and (b).  The ongoing discretionary parole release
consideration process culminates with the inmate’s appearance before a Parole Board
panel.  See 9 NYCRR §8002.2.  At the Parole Board appearance, which is open-ended in
nature, the panel of parole commissioners not only has an opportunity for face-to-face
interaction with the prospective parolee, but also may solicit from him/her clarification
of and/or additional information with respect to the various records, reports and
recommendations compiled in anticipation of such inmate’s eligibility for discretionary
parole release.  In addition, the Parole Board appearance affords the prospective parolee
a final opportunity to clarify, comment upon and/or supplement such records, reports
and recommendations and to otherwise finalize his/her argument(s) in support of
discretionary release.  Thus the parole release interview can be viewed as the final element
in the creation of the record underlying a discretionary parole release determination.  For
this reason the Court finds that the Parole Board appearance represents that point on the
discretionary parole release consideration continuum which is determinative with respect
to the issue of which version of Executive Law §259-c(4) is applicable.  The Court
therefore concludes that the pre-amendment version of Executive Law §259-c(4) is
properly applicable where, as here, the Parole Board appearance was concluded prior to
September 30, 2011, notwithstanding the fact that the written parole denial determination
was issued after that date.
A significant portion of the petition is focused, in one way or another, on the
assertion that the parole denial determination was improperly based solely on the nature
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration, without adequate consideration of
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other relevant statutory factors.  According to petitioner, the “ . . . Parole Board’s decision
is only rely [sic] on petitioner’s offense and parole board briefly mention petitioner’s
institutional record and rehabilitation.  Parole Board’s consideration on only one factor,
that petitioner can never change, making this decision capricious and irrational.”  A
Parole Board, however, need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.  As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar,  reviews of the Inmate  Status Report and transcript of the Parole
Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information with respect to the
appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s therapeutic and vocational
programming,  academic achievements, receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC),
limited disciplinary record, release plans, community support, lack of a prior criminal
record in addition to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration.  See
Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing
transcript to suggest that the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor
7 of 10 
[* 7]
or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. 
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the parole board failed to
consider the relevant statutory factors.  See McAllister v. New York State Division of
Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354.   Since
the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial
review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude
that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes
underlying petitioner’s incarceration.  See Sanchez v. Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305,
Maricevic v. Evans, 86 AD3d 879 and Cruz v. New York State Division of Parole, 39
AD3d 1060.
With regard to petitioner’s receipt of an EEC, it is noted that Correction Law §805
provides, in relevant  in part, as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an
inmate who is serving a sentence with a minimum term of not more than eight years and
who has been issued a certificate of earned eligibility, shall be granted parole release at
the expiration  of his minimum term . . .  unless the board of parole determines that there
is a reasonable probability that, if  such inmate is released, he will not live and remain at
liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of
society.”  In similar fashion, 9 NYCRR §8002.3(c) provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen
the minimum term of imprisonment is in accord with or greater than the time ranges for
imprisonment contained within the guidelines adopted pursuant to this Part, parole
release shall be granted at the expiration of such minimum term of imprisonment as long
as such release is in accordance with the remaining guideline criteria.”  It is clear,
however, that an inmate’s receipt of a EEC does not preclude the Parole Board from
issuing a determination denying discretionary parole release nor does such receipt
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preclude the Board from considering the nature of the crime(s) underlying the inmate’s
incarceration.  See Sanchez v. Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305, Rodriguez v. Evans, 82
AD3d 1397, Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354 and Corley v. New York State Division of
Parole, 33  AD3d  1142.
Addressing the fact that he was denied discretionary parole release after the
issuance of an EEC, the petitioner next suggests that the 2011 merger of the Division of
Parole with the Department of Correctional Services to form the Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision has rendered it “capricious and irrational by
making two decisions from one department.” The Court notes, however, that
notwithstanding such merger the underlying legislation maintained the independent
decision-making function of the Board of Parole as follows: “It is fundamental that the
board of parole retain its authority to make release decisions based on the board
members’ independent judgment and application of statutory criteria . . . To this end, the
legislation makes clear that the board shall continue to exercise its independence when
making such decisions.  The new agency’s [DOCCS] provision of administrative support
will not undermine the board’s independent decision-making authority.”  L 2011, ch 62,
Part C, Sub A, §1.
Petitioner also points out that in the written parole denial determination the Board
incorrectly stated that it was a passenger in the second vehicle (not operated by petitioner)
who lost his life.  “[T]his point,” according to petitioner, “showes [sic] parole board’s
ignorance to look [into] petitioner’s case and made [sic] instant decision.”  Where
erroneous information serves as a basis for a parole denial determination, such
determination must be vacated and a new hearing ordered.  See Smith v. New York State
Board of Parole, 34 AD3d 1156, Hughes v. New York Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1176
and Lewis v. Travis, 9 AD3d 800.  Although it is clear that petitioner’s Parole Board was
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under the erroneous assumption that the deceased victim was a passenger in the second
vehicle, rather than the vehicle operated by petitioner, the Court finds no basis to
conclude that this erroneous information served as a basis for the underlying parole
denial determination.  Petitioner does not suggest, not can this Court fathom, any thought
process whereby the precise seating location of the deceased passenger (in petitioner’s
vehicle or the other vehicle) might have been a relevant factor in the Parole Board’s
consideration of whether or not petitioner should be released to parole supervision. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the erroneous information set forth in the parole denial
determination does not constitute a basis to overturn that determination.  See Sutherland
v. Evans, 82 AD3d 1428 and Restivo v. New York State Board of Parole, 70 AD3d 1096.
Finally, under the facts and circumstances of this case the Court finds no basis to
conclude that the parole denial determination usurped the authority of the judiciary by
effectively resentencing petitioner for his crimes.  See Comfort v. New York State Division
of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, Smith v. New York State Division of Parole, 64 AD3d 1030 and
Marsh v. New York State Division of Parole, 31 AD3d 898.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated:  September 10, 2012 at 
    Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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